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Abstract
Stein and colleagues argue there is no yet conclusive evidence for nonconscious working memory (WM) and that is critical
to probeWMwhile ensuring null sensitivity to memory cues. While this stringent approach reduces the likelihood of non-
conscious signaling for WM, we discuss existing work meeting this null sensitivity criteria, and, related work on noncon-
scious cognition in keeping with WM/awareness dissociations on the basis of a functional operational definition of WM.
Further, because it is likely that WM is a nonunitary functional construct and visual awareness a gradual phenomenon, we
propose that delineating the neural mechanisms for distinct WM types across different levels of awareness may prove the
most fruitful approach for understanding the interplay betweenWM and consciousness.
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Stein et al. (2016) point out methodological hurdles in assessing
the scope of working memory (WM) operations over noncon-
scious input, and more generally, to bolster alternative views
that WM and awareness may be dissociable. Stein et al. argue
that it is paramount to use bias-free objective sensitivity mea-
sures and ensure that observers have null sensitivity of the
memory cues (i.e. d’ ¼ 0). Stein et al. rightly point out that the ob-
jective sensitivity measure used in prior studies of nonconscious
WM (Soto et al. 2011; Dutta et al. 2014) was influenced by the indi-
vidual decision bias in reporting (un)awareness, and therefore
was not a pure sensitivity measure but rather a pseudo-d’. The
reason for this was that these studies of nonconscious WM
aimed to compute a sensitivity measure specific for the trials
rated as subjectively unaware (i.e. using the proportion of un-
aware trials on trials without memory cue as performance hits).
Most notably, these initial studies on nonconscious WM were
not set to dissociate WM from null sensitivity to the presence of
the memory cue, but to explore dissociations between WM per-
formance and subjective measures of awareness, which, accord-
ing to recent approaches are the most relevant proxy to
conscious experience (e.g. Sandberg et al. 2010). Signal detection
theory (STD)-based sensitivity indices of stimulus processing are
excellent measures of performance. But these may not be diag-
nostic of the state of awareness, because a given level of sensi-
tivity (i.e. d’ ¼ 1) may reflect both nonconscious and conscious
processes, hence likely overestimating conscious perception
(Persaud et al. 2007; Dehaene and Changeux 2011; though see
Peters and Lau 2015). Further, it turns out that at least in detec-
tion tasks, SDT analyses cannot distinguish between sensitivity
and decision bias effects (Witt et al. 2015), which is to say that de-
cision criteria can reflect actual conscious perception rather
than mere response biases. There are grounds therefore to cast
doubt on the utility of focusing exclusively on sensitivity mea-
sures in the study of visual awareness. We also note that
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Spotlight Commentary
Soto et al. (2011) found no correlation between individual percep-
tual sensitivity of cue and the level of WM performance; but note
this correlation is clearly expected if WM performance was cou-
pled with cue sensitivity. A reanalyses of the data from Soto et al.
(2011) using the bias-free sensitivity approach proposed by Stein
et al. (2016) confirmed again the absence of correlation between
cue sensitivity and individual WM performance (Pearson’s corre-
lation: 0.24, t ¼ 1.08, P < 0.29). Further, it is noted that the
mean pseudo-d’ in Soto et al. (2011) was 0.311 while the d’ calcu-
lated following the Stein et al. procedure is 0.454; both were
highly correlated (Pearson’s coefficient: 0. 891, P < 0.0001).
However, this absence of correlation between WM performance
and cue sensitivity is not strong evidence of absence and hence
this issue needs to be systematically assessed by high-powered
interindividual differences paradigms and within-subject reli-
ability tests across multiple sessions.
Stein et al. (2016) also note that the above findings from Soto
et al. (2011) could be instead accounted by the operation of per-
ceptual (rather than WM) processes, wherein observers use a
nonconscious or weakly conscious perceptual representations
of the masked cue to make a conscious guess which is then
held in WM during the delay period. Note this account would
also predict a tight interindividual correlation between cue sen-
sitivity and WM performance as better cue sensitivity should
elicit conscious guesses of higher fidelity. We agree with Stein
et al. that evidence of successful WM given null sensitivity of
memory cues would strongly support the view that WM can op-
erate on nonconscious representations. Notably, however, there
are a couple of studies meeting this stringent criteria. Pan et al.
(2014) asked participants to keep in WM a face cue, which could
be conscious or nonconscious (i.e. a 10-ms masked cued associ-
ated with null detection d’ using the bias-free objective sensitiv-
ity measure proposed by Stein et al. 2016). There followed a
dichoptic display composed of colored Mondrian-like patterns
to one eye, which masked from awareness the information pre-
sented in the other eye (i.e. continuous flash suppression;
Tsuchiya and Koch 2005). The contrast of the face in the “sup-
pressed” eye ramped up gradually and participants had to de-
tect its location. Reaction times were faster when the target face
in the suppressed eye matched the initial cue held in WM, rela-
tive to the nonmatch baseline. Memory biases of awareness
were driven from both conscious and nonconscious cues, but
only when participants were instructed to retain the cues in
WM for a later recognition test, and not when participants at-
tended the face cues without memory maintenance require-
ments; hence ruling out priming accounts of the memory effect
(Soto et al. 2008). Thereby, these findings suggest that noncon-
scious cues were held in WM in order to boost awareness of a
matching face during flash suppression.
Additional relevant evidence comes from recent work by
Rosenthal and colleagues (2010, 2016) using a visuospatial
learning protocol in which a complex sequence of targets oc-
curred repeatedly across four placeholders (i.e. locations 1-2-3-
4). The sequence (i.e. 3 4 2 3 1 2 1 4 3 2 4 1) was based on a 12-ele-
ment second-order conditional rule. There were 4 monocular
placeholders: 1 and 2 were presented to the left eye, while 3 and
4 were presented to the right eye by means of stereoscopic pre-
sentation. This triggered binocular fusion of the 4 monocular
placeholders from left and right eyes, leading to conscious per-
ception of 2 placeholders only. Hence the four monocular loca-
tions in which the sequence was embedded were continuously
masked from visual awareness. Following the study phase, se-
quence knowledge was assessed by means of a surprise old/
new recognition test composed of trained (old) and untrained
(new) recognition sequences, which critically differed only at
the level of the (masked) monocular sequential order but were
otherwise identical when viewed at a conscious binocular level.
While participants could not perceive the monocular locations
of the sequence, as confirmed by the null sensitivity in forced-
choice location discrimination tests, performance in the recog-
nition memory test revealed that nevertheless the sequence
was learnt. In particular, memory confidence was higher for old
(trained) than for new sequences during recognition. These re-
sults demonstrate successful acquisition of nonconscious
higher-order sequence knowledge and later recognition without
awareness. Crucially, in order to learn the spatiotemporal serial
order of the 12-element sequence of targets, spatial information
had to be maintained and integrated across several seconds,
which is in keeping with the operational definition of WM. The
learned sequences also biased other cognitive processes,
namely, later memory-guided behavior and retrieval in the sub-
sequent recognition test, which also involves the interplay be-
tween WM and long-termmemory systems (Baddeley 2003).
The above evidence for WM operations on nonconscious in-
put also aligns with other evidence that higher-order cognitive
processes such as executive control during conflict (van Gaal
et al. 2012), arithmetic computations (Ric and Muller 2012), and
sentence processing (Sklar et al. 2012) can be performed on in-
formation that is nonconscious, confirmed also by stringent
tests of perceptual sensitivity. Functional operations involved
in executive control, arithmetic and processing of sentences
(e.g. during reading) are also within the functional operational
definition of WM.
Stein et al. argue that it is difficult to imagine a situation in
which we are not consciously aware of the stimuli that enter
WM. However, masked distracters that go undetected can
nevertheless enter WM and modulate the fidelity of the repre-
sentations that are consciously maintained in WM (Silvanto
and Soto 2012). There are also demonstrations that conscious
awareness of WM content does not accurately track the fidel-
ity of WM contents (Bona et al. 2013), indicating that the phe-
nomenology of WM does not always reflect the actual WM
content. There are thus several lines of evidence which, taken
together, lead to a theoretical reevaluation of the putatively
close link between consciousness and WM (Soto and Silvanto
2014).
By no account, however, experimental data supporting a dis-
sociation between WM processes and conscious awareness
should be strictly taken to suggest that WM and conscious
awareness are independent cognitive systems, but that they
can be partially segregated in different contexts. Because WM is
a nonunitary psychological construct, the distinct WM types
may relate differently to conscious awareness, also, considering
that awareness is likely not an all or none phenomenon
(Kouider et al. 2010; Windey et al. 2014) and may be best con-
ceived as a gradual property. There are at least a few neural
mechanisms for WM functions, including: synaptic mecha-
nisms for information maintenance (i.e. through calcium kinet-
ics in task-relevant neural substrates) (Mongillo et al. 2008),
persistent neural firing (Sreenivasan et al. 2014), and oscillatory
network coherence (Palva and Palva 2012). One could hypothe-
size that persistent neural activity could reflect the conscious use
of memory contents for cognitive control, conscious reflection,
or manipulation of relevant memoranda. Synaptic memory
mechanisms or specific states of functional connectivity (e.g.
frequency-specific network coherence), on the other hand, can
provide alternative (silent) coding scheme for WM in the ab-
sence of persistent neural firing (cf. Stokes 2015), which could
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support the maintenance of “nonconscious” information over
short periods of time. The expression of these neural mecha-
nisms for WM and how they relate to awareness is also likely to
be modulated by the complexity of the information and/or the
computations required to solve the task. Hence, it is unlikely
there is a binary response to the question of whether WM can
operate outside awareness.
In summary, the development of new psychophysical proto-
cols to probe WM processes stemming from cues associated
with null sensitivity may be useful but, notably, constraints due
to weakening the cue signal may only reduce the likelihood of
nonconscious signaling for WM and hence little WM effects on
behavioral measures. We believe that a more fruitful avenue for
future research is to take the subjective reports of awareness at
face value and test the neural differentiation of WM processes
across the different states of (un)awareness, while considering
the diversity of WM types, task contexts, and object-level do-
mains in which WM and awareness operate. In this vein, a re-
cent MEG study combined the nonconscious WM paradigm
from Soto et al. (2011) with cutting edge decoding analyses to
track moment-to-moment changes in the neural representa-
tions of conscious and nonconscious memoranda and demon-
strate the existence of qualitatively distinct, selective
mechanisms for keeping information in WM across different
states of (un)awareness (King et al. 2016).
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